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Google—Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: 
Why the Tech Giant Is a “Bad” Monopoly 
ALICIA GINSBERG† 
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to promote competition and creativity in the 
marketplace. The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that restrain trade and lays out rules 
regarding monopoly power. This Note explores three distinct theories under which Google, one 
of the most successful technology companies in the world, could be found to have violated the 
Sherman Act. Specifically, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Google “ties” its 
products together and forces mobile device manufacturers to sign exclusive dealing agreements 
preventing them from purchasing products from Google’s competitors. Further, Google’s 
systematic obstruction of competing Android operating systems is a form of anticompetitive 
conduct in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This Note argues that Google is indisputably 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under U.S. antitrust laws, businesses may not take concerted private action 
to improperly interfere in the functioning of competitive markets.1 In 1890, the 
Sherman Act, the principle statute at the center of U.S. antitrust policy, was 
designed to be a charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving competition in 
trade,2 and a tool to protect the public from monopoly power.3 In 1914, the U.S. 
federal government created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce 
antitrust laws.4 The FTC’s mission is to “protect consumers and competition by 
preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices . . . without 
unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”5 A core tenet of U.S. antitrust 
policy is that unrestrained, unfettered interaction of competitive forces will yield 
the best allocation of economic resources and lowest prices for consumers, while 
simultaneously fostering an environment that is conducive to the preservation of 
our democratic political and social institutions.6  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies “in restraint of trade or commerce.”7 This means that firms are 
prohibited from agreeing amongst themselves to act in ways that harm the 
markets in which they participate. While the language of the statute is broad, 
courts have construed it narrowly, to preclude only contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain competition through undue restraints.8  
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is illegal to monopolize, attempt to 
monopolize, or conspire with others to monopolize any part of trade or 
commerce.9 Section 2 forbids the use of monopolistic power by making it illegal 
for any single large business to try to exclude all or most of its competitors from 
the marketplace.  
Courts have grappled with striking a balance between assuring adequate 
returns for innovation, protecting dominant firms’ opportunities for efficiency, 
and foreclosing unnecessarily aggressive conduct likely to prolong monopolists’ 
 
 1. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1219, 1220, 1258 
(1988) (discussing how two or more competitors might agree among themselves to suppress competition, thereby 
creating a monopoly in a market in which there had previously been rivalry and why these agreements should 
be held unenforceable). 
 2. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).  
 3. See Millon, supra note 1, at 1220, 1260. 
 4. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
 5. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
 6. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (rationalizing that Congress did not 
intend Section 1 to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts that do not unduly restrain interstate or foreign 
commerce); see also Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (“Every board of trade and nearly 
every trade organization imposes some restraint upon the conduct of business by its members.”).  
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).  
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income flow.10 Claims that allege violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.11 This process requires a fact-
intensive analysis and appraisal of the evidence, and courts must focus their 
inquiries on the goal of protecting the competitive process from overly 
aggressive strategies.12  
Additionally, the antitrust legal system faces a new set of challenges with 
the rise of technology and e-commerce markets.13 Issues of competition in high-
technology industries have different characteristics compared to those of 
traditional markets, and courts must take these variances into account when 
considering allegations of Sherman Act violations.14 For example, high-
technology companies like Google have the potential to grow, and have grown, 
extremely fast, and many of their products are free for consumers to use.15 
Additionally, high-technology companies are able to price goods below-cost in 
order to build market share, and then expand into an array of adjacent businesses 
to build an online infrastructure that their rivals depend on, giving them access 
to the data their transactions generate.16 Courts must apply antitrust laws with 
sensitivity to special characteristics of high-technology industries and recognize 
the special role that competition plays in both stimulating innovation and in 
disseminating the benefits of innovation to consumers.17  
Currently, mobile device manufacturers (“manufacturers”) that want to 
build and sell smartphones that run the latest version of the Android operating 
system (“Android OS” or “Android”), and who wish to pre-install popular 
Google mobile applications (“apps”), are required to sign contracts with 
Google.18 These contracts require manufacturers to pre-install certain Google 
apps as a condition for licensing other Google apps and Google’s version of 
Android OS, thereby functioning as a way for Google to integrate more of its 
services into Android.19 Additionally, Google offers revenue-sharing 
agreements (RSAs) to manufacturers, which ensure that Google Search, 
 
 10. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies by Dominant Firms, 
21 SW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1262 (1992). 
 11. See id. at 1262–63. 
 12. See id.  
 13. See Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Technology Firms Challenge Traditional 
Assumptions About Antitrust Enforcement, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 
techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/.  
 14. Doris Karina Oropeza Mendoza, Antitrust in the New Economy Case Google Inc. Against Economic 
Competition on Web, 8 MEXICAN L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2016). 
 15. See Robert Levine, Antitrust Law Never Envisioned Massive Tech Companies like Google, BOS. GLOBE 
(June 13, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/06/13/google-hugely-powerful-antitrust-law-job/ 
E1eqrlQ01g11DRM8I9FxwO/story.html.  
 16. See id.  
 17. William J. Baer, Former Dir., Bureau of Competition, Speech at the American Bar Association, 
Sections of Business Law, Litigation, and Tort and Insurance Practice Conference: Antitrust Enforcement and 
High Technology Markets (Nov. 12, 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/11/antitrust-
enforcement-and-high-technology-markets. 
 18. See infra Subpart II.B.  
 19. See infra Part II.  
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Google’s internet search app, is the only default and pre-installed internet search 
on all devices manufacturers under contract will distribute.20 Finally, by 
requiring manufacturers to sign anti-fragmentation agreements (AFAs) and 
taking steps to decrease the compatibility between its apps and competitors’ 
versions of Android OS, Google obstructs the development and distribution of 
alternative versions of Android.21  
Google’s market strategy for its apps, internet search, and Android OS 
closely resembles Microsoft’s strategy regarding its Windows operating system 
(“Windows OS”) for personal computers (PCs), which resulted in a legal and 
reputational nightmare for Microsoft. As explained in greater detail, in 2001, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held Microsoft liable for multiple violations of 
antitrust law.22 First, although the D.C. Circuit remanded the district court’s 
conclusion that Microsoft was liable for illegal tying of its flagship Internet 
Explorer browser to its Windows OS, it provided a framework for analyzing a 
tying arrangement when the tying product is platform software.23 Second, the 
court held that Microsoft’s conduct in forming restrictive licensing agreements 
with manufacturers was illegal.24 Third, Microsoft was found to have abused its 
monopoly power by taking steps to intentionally restrict the development of 
cross-platform programs for Java.25  
These striking parallels between Google’s conduct and Microsoft’s 
conduct raise legitimate antitrust concerns. During the Microsoft litigation, New 
York Attorney General Dennis Vacco aptly stated that “[i]t would be unfortunate 
if one company were allowed to control access to the Internet in violation of the 
antitrust laws, restricting consumer choice and stifling competition before it has 
a chance to develop.”26 His comment was aimed towards Microsoft; however, 
these fears are just as relevant today as they were twenty years ago. Google’s 
Android OS is regarded as “the Windows of the mobile device era, powering 
nearly 80% of smartphones globally . . . . Windows commanded roughly 90 
percent of the PC market in the 1990s.”27 Google’s enormous influence is 
indisputable, and this Note proposes three theories under which Google may 
have restrained trade and maintained its monopoly in violation of Sections 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act. 
 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 23. See id. at 89–95. 
 24. See id. at 61. 
 25. See id. at 75–77. 
 26. Richard B. McKenzie & William F. Shughart II, Is Microsoft a Monopolist?, 3 INDEP. REV. 165, 167 
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco).   
 27. Amir Efrati, With Shades of Microsoft, Google Android Invites Antitrust Case, INFO. (Oct. 16, 2014, 
11:44 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/With-Shades-of-Microsoft-Google-Android-Invites-
Antitrust-Case.  
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I.  THREE THEORIES OF GOOGLE’S SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS 
In order to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff 
must provide enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that (1) an 
agreement exists between parties and (2) the agreement constitutes an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.28 The crucial question is whether the challenged 
conduct stems from independent decision-making or from an agreement.29 “An 
agreement exists when there is a unity of purpose, a common design and 
understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme.”30 A plaintiff must show that the defendant purposefully joined and 
participated in the conspiracy, by providing direct evidence, circumstantial 
evidence, or a combination of the two.31  
In order to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant (1) possesses monopoly power and (2) uses that 
monopoly power to either foreclose competition, gain a competitive advantage, 
or destroy a competitor.32 The inquiry is whether the firm has aggressively 
suppressed competition on the merits, which is legal, or whether it has engaged 
in conduct that impairs competitive opportunity, distorts the competitive 
process, and makes market outcomes turn on power, which would be a violation 
of Section 2.33 Thus, having a monopoly does not by itself violate Section 2—a 
firm violates Section 2 only when it maintains, or attempts to maintain, its 
monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct “as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”34 Therefore, there must be proof that the conduct harms the 
competitive process and competition in general.35 Showing harm to one or more 
competitors is not sufficient.36 
In a case against Google, there are three viable theories of violations of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Each theory is addressed separately in the 
following parts of this Note. Part II addresses the first theory, that Google 
restrains trade and maintains its monopoly by tying the download of Google Play 
and Google’s version of Android OS to the pre-installation of Google Search 
and Google Chrome. Part III focuses on the second theory, that Google restrains 
trade and maintains its monopoly by forcing mobile device manufacturers into 
 
 28. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 189–91 (2010). 
 29. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007).  
 30. W. Pa. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 31. See id.; see also In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 709, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  
 32. Aerotec Int’l v. Honeywell Int’l, 836 F.3d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 482–83 (1992)).  
 33. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954); see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1229 (discussing the history of the formulation of 
courts’ examination of power and conduct in monopolization cases).  
 34. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 35. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985); see also United 
States v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 36. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.  
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exclusive dealing arrangements in which they are required to pre-install Google 
Search onto their devices. Part IV explores the third theory, that Google 
maintains its monopoly by inhibiting the development and distribution of 
alternative versions of Android OS. 
II.  TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
A “tying arrangement” exists where a firm agrees to sell one product over 
which it has market power, contingent on the condition that the buyer also 
purchases a different product.37 The product the buyer wants is referred to as the 
“tying product,” and the product the buyer is forced to take with the tying 
product is the “tied product.”38 Anticompetitive tying arrangements have been 
illegal in the United States since 1917, and can be challenged as a restraint of 
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and as an exclusionary act by a 
dominant firm under Section 2.39 Anticompetitive tying arrangements are illegal 
because they limit the purchaser’s freedom to buy products from other sources,40 
thus inhibiting competition. In Northern Pacific Railway Co., the Supreme Court 
explained the nefarious effects of tying arrangements: 
[Tying arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied 
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better 
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another 
market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice 
between competing products.41 
There are four essential elements of a tying claim: (1) the tying and tied 
goods are two separate products; (2) the agreement to license one product is 
conditioned on the license of another product; (3) the seller has market power in 
the tying product market; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial 
volume of commerce.42  
A. SEPARATE PRODUCTS 
An illegal tying arrangement cannot exist unless the tying and tied products 
are separate.43 To make that assessment, the Supreme Court has fashioned a test 
driven by evidence of producer behavior and consumer demand, rather than on 
a court’s own speculative, subjective effort to define boundaries of distinct 
products. This inquiry focuses on the character of the demand for the two 
products, rather than whether they were sold as a functionally integrated 
package.44 The products can only be found separate if there is “sufficient 
 
 37. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958). 
 38. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 925, 926 (2010). 
 39. A.B.A., 1 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 174 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012). 
 40. Id. 
 41. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6. 
 42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 43. See generally Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 44. Id. at 19. 
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consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide 
[them] . . . separately.”45  
Under this test, products are considered to be “separate” if they could be 
profitably marketed separately.46 This can be satisfied if the plaintiff can show 
that consumers want to purchase the products separately. If not, there is little 
risk that the tying arrangement would prevent separate sales of the products.47 
However, products can still be considered separate even if no consumer would 
want one without the other.48 Hence, it is not a question of whether consumers 
need or want both products, or even whether consumers would want one without 
the other.49 So long as there could be a viable market for sales of one of the 
products alone, they are considered separate.50  
In Jefferson Parish, a hospital entered into an exclusive contract with an 
anesthesiology firm, requiring every patient undergoing surgery at the hospital 
to use the services of the contracted anesthesiology firm.51 The Supreme Court 
held that anesthesiology and other hospital services are considered two separate 
products for the purposes of the tying analysis.52 The Court reasoned that even 
though no one would want surgery without anesthesia, people differentiate 
between anesthesiological services and other hospital services, and therefore the 
hospital’s arrangement involved the required purchase of two services that could 
otherwise be purchased separately.53  
Under a similar line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak 
held that spare parts used for repair or replacement and equipment service for 
copying machines are two separate products.54 The Court concluded that there 
may be a demand for parts separate from service because at least some 
consumers would purchase service without parts, some service does not require 
parts, and some consumers would purchase parts without service.55 Therefore, 
parts and service were considered two distinct products.56 
In a case against Google, the tying products are Google Play (an Android-
compatible app store) and Google’s version of Android OS. The tied products 
are Google Search and Google Chrome, Google’s internet search app and mobile 
web browser app, respectively. Google’s version of Android OS is separate from 
 
 45. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).  
 46. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 21–22. 
 47. Alexandra Mitretodis, What Constitutes a Separate Product?, COMPETITION CHRON. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.competitionchronicle.com/2017/12/what-constitutes-a-separate-product/.  
 48. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 19 n.30 (“We have often found arrangements involving 
functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.”). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 21. 
 51. Id. at 4–5. 
 52. Id. at 25. 
 53. Id. at 23–24. 
 54. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462–63 (1992). 
 55. Id. at 463. 
 56. Id. at 462–63. 
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its apps because each has a separate market demand and distinct purpose.57 Users 
can use Android OS without using Google apps, and instead use apps from other 
vendors. Other users may only want to use certain Google apps.58 Each app has 
a separate name, installation package, and icon, and there is no technical reason 
why one app may require the installation of another.59 During the Microsoft 
litigation, the district court ruled that Windows OS and Internet Explorer were 
separate products, recognizing that a browser program may be a separate product 
from an operating system because consumers would select their browser 
separately if given the option to choose.60 Similarly, the General Court of the 
European Union (EU) found that Windows OS and Windows Media Player, a 
PC program, were separate products.61 The FTC has also recognized internet 
search as its own market.62 Moreover, in Pepper v. Apple, the Apple app store, 
which is similar to Google Play but compatible only with the Apple mobile 
device operating system, was recognized as a separate product from Apple’s 
mobile operating system, iOS.63 Therefore, individual apps for internet search 
and web browsing, Android-compatible app stores, and mobile device operating 
systems constitute separate products for the purpose of a tying analysis.  
B. COERCION 
Where a consumer is free to take either product by itself, there is no tying.64 
However, if a firm has made the joint purchase of two products the only viable 
option, a jury may find that the defendant has effectively tied the two products 
together.65 Some proof of coercion is required to establish that a buyer was 
forced to purchase a product that the buyer did not want.66 Copies of Google’s 
Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA) provide proof of 
 
 57. Benjamin Edelman, Leveraging Market Power Through Tying: Does Google Behave Anti-
Competitively, BEN EDELMAN (May 12, 2014), https://www.benedelman.org/publications/google-tying-2014-
05-12.pdf. 
 58. Id.   
 59. Id. at 28. 
 60. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49–51 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing the liability finding of the district court on the per se tying 
theory and remanding for further consideration of the tying claim under the rule of reason). The case settled 
without a final determination on the tying theory; however, the Circuit Court’s discussion of tying is applicable 
to Google. See Richard Richtmyer, No Microsoft Breakup: U.S., CNN MONEY (Sept. 6, 2001), 
https://money.cnn.com/2001/09/06/technology/microsoft/.  
 61. Edelman, supra note 57, at 9. 
 62. See generally F.T.C. FILE NO. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/ 
071220googledc-commstmt.pdf (distinguishing between the search advertising market and other online 
advertising markets and concluding that the search market is separate).  
 63. See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 323–24 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 64. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). 
 65. See Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20158, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 
1996) (“To prove an illegal tie, a plaintiff must show that the purchase of the tying product together with the tied 
product was the purchaser’s only economically viable option.”). 
 66. See Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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coercion.67 Key provisions of the MADA that show manufacturers must agree 
to install all of the apps Google specifies include:  
“Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications . . . are pre-
installed on the Device.”68 
“Company will preload all Google Applications approved in the applicable 
Territory or Territories on each Device.”69 
“Search must be set as the default search provider for all Web search access 
points on the Device.”70 
Installing Google Search and Google Chrome is a prerequisite to installing 
Google Play and Google’s version of Android.71 If manufacturers want a license 
to pre-load one Google app, they have to take others along with it. Courts have 
found that the requisite coercion can be proven by evidence of a contract.72 
Therefore, these MADA provisions are sufficient to show that in order to 
distribute Google Play and Google’s Android OS, manufacturers are forced to 
select the only viable option—the pre-installation of Google Search and Google 
Chrome. 
C. MARKET POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKETS 
A market consists of all products in a geographic area that exert 
competitive constraints on each other.73 A “relevant market,” for the purpose of 
analyzing market power, includes all products that are reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes and is defined in terms of 
two components: the relevant geographic market and the relevant product 
market.74  
The relevant geographic market identifies the geographic area in which 
businesses compete in marketing their products.75 It must “‘correspond to the 
commercial realities’ of the industry and be economically significant.”76 In some 
situations, the relevant geographic market may encompass an entire country, and 
in others, it may constitute a single metropolitan area.77 For many high-
 
 67. See Class Action Complaint at 32–33, Feitelson v. Google, 80 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 
5:14-cv-02007).  
 68.  Exhibit B to Class Action Complaint at 3, Feitelson v. Google, 80 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 
5:14-cv-02007).  
 69. Id. at 4.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 3.  
 72. See Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Amerinet, Inc. v. 
Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1500 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Typically, an express refusal to sell the tying product without 
the tied product is the basis for an illegal tying arrangement.”).  
 73. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956). 
 74. See id.; see also F.T.C. v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 75. F.T.C. v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing F.T.C. v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. 
Supp. 2d 109, 119 (D.D.C. 2004)). 
 76. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336–37 (1962) (footnote omitted) (quoting Am. 
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)). 
 77. Id. at 337. 
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technology products, including those that Google provides, the relevant 
geographic market is at the very least the entire United States, if not the entire 
world.78  
The relevant product market identifies the competing products at issue.79 
Products are considered to be in the same relevant market if consumers would 
consider them potential alternatives to each other—in other words, if a consumer 
can substitute an alternative product when the price of another product has 
increased, the products would likely be considered in the same relevant market. 
For the purposes of Google’s market power analysis, with respect to its tying 
arrangements, the relevant product markets are internet search apps, browser 
apps, Android-compatible app stores, and Android operating systems. 
The concepts of “market power” and “monopoly power” both refer to 
anticompetitive economic power that can ultimately compromise consumer 
welfare.80 Although the Supreme Court has yet to write an opinion that 
deliberately and explicitly contrasts these two terms, its chosen language in 
separate cases has articulated standards for each.81 In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 
the Court defined market power as “the ability to raise prices above those that 
would be charged in a competitive market.”82 In United States v. E. I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., the Court defined monopoly power as “the power to control 
prices or exclude competition” in the relevant market.83 However, because the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent about whether these two concepts are 
similar or distinct,84 they will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this 
Note.  
Market power, or monopoly power, is the power to exclude competition in 
the relevant market.85 If a consumer could readily use alternatives in the relevant 
product market, an illegal monopoly does not exist.86 In other words, there is 
monopoly power when a product is controlled by one firm and there are no 
substitutes available.87 In the United States, a market share in excess of 70% 
generally establishes a prima facie case of monopoly power,88 and an allegation 
 
 78. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 197 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing how multichannel 
video distribution markets are located nationwide, and it is therefore appropriate to derive a measure of 
nationwide economic harm).  
 79. See Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d at 24. 
 80. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 241, 246 (1987).  
 81. Id. at 246–47. 
 82. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984).  
 83. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 84. See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 80, at 246. 
 85. Samuel R. Miller, If Google Is a “Bad” Monopoly, What Should Be Done?, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2013, 
7:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/481993. 
 86. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 394. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See A.B.A., supra note 39, at 231.  
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that a firm enjoys a 50–75% market share has been sufficient to state a 
monopolization claim.89  
As of September 2019, in the United States, Google held 94.26% of the 
mobile search engine market share,90 and 40.21% of the mobile browser market 
share.91 With regard to Google’s market share in the Android-compatible app 
stores market, Google Play delivers over 95% of apps downloaded to Android 
phones.92 According to Statcounter, an independent web analytics company, as 
of September 2019, Android had 44.15% of the mobile device operating system 
market share in the United States and 76.24% of the mobile device operating 
system market share worldwide.93 Statista, an online statistics and market 
research portal, lists Google’s market share in the mobile device operating 
system market slightly higher. Statista reports that in June 2019, 51.1% of 
smartphone subscribers in the United States were using a Google Android 
device.94 In 2017, Android’s market share worldwide was 85.9%.95 Android’s 
market share in the mobile device operating system market is by far the most 
used operating system worldwide. Google’s dominance is evidence of its power 
in the markets of its tying products, Google Search and Google Chrome.  
D. FORECLOSURE OF COMMERCE 
For a tying arrangement to be illegal, it must foreclose a substantial amount 
of commerce in the tied product.96 Conclusory allegations of anticompetitive 
effect are insufficient without supporting facts that show how competition in the 
tied markets has actually been harmed, and that demonstrate how consumers 
have suffered injury as a result of choices being limited because of the tied 
 
 89. LG Elecs. v. ASKO Appliances, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31571, at *14 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2010).  
 90. See Mobile Search Engine Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
 91. See Mobile Search Engine Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2020); see also Mobile Browser Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2020). 
 92. Peter Sayer, Google Faces $5B Fine Over Android Browser and Search Engine Ties, 
COMPUTERWORLD (July 18, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3290471/google-faces-
5b-fine-over-android-browser-and-search-engine-ties.html. 
 93. See Mobile Operating System Market Share United States of America—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, 
STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020); see also Mobile Operating System Market Share Worldwide—Dec. 2018–Dec. 2019, STATCOUNTER, 
http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/worldwide (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 94. See Arne Holst, Subscriber Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems in the United States from 
2012 to 2019, STATISTA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-
smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/. 
 95. See Arne Holst, Global Market Share Held by Smartphone Operating Systems from 2009 to 2017, 
STATISTA (June 4, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/263453/global-market-share-held-by-smartphone-
operating-systems/. 
 96. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958). 
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products.97 There is compelling evidence that Google’s ties thwart competition 
in the markets for the tied products.  
Google has substantially hindered market access of creators of rival 
Android-compatible app stores by tying Google Search and Google Chrome 
with Google Play. While Android apps are available from a variety of Android-
compatible app stores, Google only makes its Google apps, which are popular 
with consumers, available through Google Play.98 With Google Play delivering 
over 95% of total apps downloaded to all Android phones worldwide,99 it is no 
surprise that the European Commission (“Commission”) described Google Play 
as a “must have” feature for manufacturers.100 It is by far the most important app 
store for the Android operating system.  
Companies like Amazon have been unsuccessful in persuading big-name 
manufacturers to produce devices that connect to its app store.101 Amazon’s Fire 
OS is an Android customization capable of running most of Google’s apps as 
well as other apps in Google Play.102 However, since it is not Google’s version 
of the Android operating system, manufacturers that program their devices with 
Amazon Fire OS cannot pre-install their devices with Google Play.103 Only 
Google Play permits manufacturers to offer users comprehensive access to 
substantially all apps, including Google’s apps.104 Therefore, devices without 
Google Play pre-installed are unattractive to consumers, consequently reducing 
Amazon Fire OS’s desirability to manufacturers.105 By engaging in tying 
arrangements, Google is leveraging its dominance of the Android-compatible 
app store market to achieve an unfair advantage in the more competitive markets 
for internet search and mobile browsing apps.106  
Additionally, fewer than 10% of Android phone users download an 
alternative browser app to the pre-installed Google Chrome app, and fewer than 
1% download an alternative search app to the pre-installed Google Search 
app.107 In 2016, 96% of all internet search queries were made using Google 
Search on devices that had it pre-installed.108 This percentage fell to less than 
25% on Windows Mobile, Microsoft’s mobile device operating system, where 
 
 97. In re Webkins Antitrust Litig., 695 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 98. Benjamin Edelman & Damien Geradin, Android and Competition Law: Exploring and Assessing 
Google’s Practices in Mobile, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J. 159, 164 (2016). 
 99. See Sayer, supra note 92. 
 100. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, On the Economics of the Google Android Case, VOXEU (Aug. 
15, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/economics-google-android-case. 
 101. See Sayer, supra note 92. 
 102. Edelman, supra note 57, at 64. 
 103. Id.   
 104. Edelman & Geradin, supra note 98, at 171.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Cornière & Taylor, supra note 100.  
 107. See Sayer, supra note 92. 
 108. See Alex Barker & Mehreen Khan, EU Fines Google Record €4.3bn Over Android, FIN. TIMES (July 
18, 2018, 1:53 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/56ae8282-89d7-11e8-b18d-0181731a0340; see also Cornière 
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Google Search was not pre-installed.109 These statistics show that the vast 
majority of users do not download competing apps and tend to simply use those 
apps that are pre-installed on their device.110 Competitors to Google’s search 
engine and browser are unable to compete on the merits and are kept out of the 
market by Google’s restrictions.111 Google’s ties obstruct competitors’ efforts to 
make deals with manufacturers because manufacturers are not able to provide 
them with default installation or exclusive placement.112 Competitors are forced 
to lower their prices and that reduction in value may make the deal unworthy of 
pursuing.113 Thus, Google’s tying arrangements foreclose a substantial amount 
of commerce by unfairly eliminating the ability of its rivals to compete.  
E. HARM TO CONSUMERS 
By imposing restrictions on Google Play and Google’s version of Android 
OS, Google harms consumers. Google’s ties insulate Google from competition, 
which harms consumers because the lack of competing vendors disincentivizes 
Google from offering greater benefits to consumers.114 Some of these benefits 
may include fewer advertisements or greater security protections against 
deceptive offers.115 Users are deprived of these potential benefits because 
Google’s ties shield it from usual competitive pressures.116 Moreover, by 
foreclosing competing vendors, Google’s ties deprive consumers of choice in 
their internet search provider.117 Because Google ties its apps with each other 
and with its version of Android, consumers do not have an option to buy or 
download apps or operating systems elsewhere.  
If a manufacturer wants to substitute a Google app with a comparable app 
developed by one of Google’s competitors, it would not be allowed to include 
any of Google’s apps under Google’s MADA restrictions.118 There are many 
reasons why a manufacturer might want to contract with another developer and 
use a non-Google app. There may be alternatives that are faster, easier to use, or 
provide more robust privacy protection.119 Thus, Google’s ties prevent third-
party vendors from outcompeting Google’s apps on the merits, even if they offer 
apps that are better than Google’s offering.120 This harms consumers because 
users’ devices may not be programmed to function at their highest ability.  
 
 109. Cornière & Taylor, supra note 100. 
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19, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/europe-google-antitrust/.  
 118. See discussion supra notes 68–70. 
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Additionally, due to Google Play’s popularity, it has become necessary for 
manufacturers to ensure that Google Play is pre-installed on their devices.121 If 
a consumer purchases a device without Google Play pre-installed, the device 
will lack easy installation of desired Google apps or other apps that are only 
available through Google Play.122 Users may risk security vulnerabilities or be 
forced to perform time-consuming manual downloads in order to download 
those apps.123 These tying restrictions cause users to disfavor Android devices 
that do not have Google Play pre-installed, which reinforces manufacturers’ 
need to agree to Google’s tying arrangements, perpetuating Google’s 
dominance.124 
Moreover, Google’s current conduct and Microsoft’s conduct leading up 
to the Microsoft case is virtually identical.125 In 2001, Windows OS, created and 
distributed by Microsoft, was the operating system that ran on more than 90% 
of PCs.126 Microsoft required PC manufacturers to pre-install certain Microsoft 
programs on their devices, including Windows Media Player and Internet 
Explorer, as a condition of installing Windows OS.127 These programs were 
provided free-of-charge to consumers with the purchase of a PC that ran on 
Windows OS.128 The D.C. Circuit found that there was strong evidence that 
consumers would not switch from the default Windows Media Player or Internet 
Explorer, and held that Microsoft’s ties were anticompetitive because they were 
capable of foreclosing access to a market for goods or services.129 
Similarly, Google ties its apps to Google Play and its version of Android 
OS.130 If a manufacturer wants to pre-install these, they must first install Google 
Search and Google Chrome, for which competitive alternatives exist.131 
Consequently, Google’s practices have reduced incentives for manufacturers to 
pre-install competing search and browser apps, and for users to download such 
apps, effectively inhibiting rivals from competing with Google. Therefore, 
Google has likely violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by tying Google 
Play and Google’s Android OS to the pre-installation of Google Search and 
Google Chrome. 
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III.  EXCLUSIVE DEALING ARRANGEMENTS WITH MANUFACTURERS 
Illegal exclusive dealing is an “agreement between a vendor and a buyer 
that prevents the buyer from purchasing a given good from any other vendor,” 
thereby foreclosing competition.132 Historically, in determining whether an 
exclusive dealing arrangement violated the Sherman Act, courts strictly focused 
on foreclosure percentage.133 Since the Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in 
Tampa Electric, courts have focused the analysis on whether the arrangement 
threatens to create or enhance market power, leading to an anticompetitive 
outcome.134  
In order to show a violation of Section 1 by exclusive dealing, a plaintiff 
must define the relevant market and demonstrate that there is substantial 
foreclosure in the relevant market due to the agreements.135 In order to show a 
violation of Section 2 by exclusive dealing, a plaintiff must show the defendant 
has monopoly power in the relevant market and that the agreements were 
anticompetitive, or exclusionary, meaning they contributed to the maintenance 
of the monopoly power.136 
Google offers RSAs to manufacturers of Android-based devices in 
exchange for exclusive default pre-installation of Google Search.137 These 
agreements prohibit manufacturers from pre-installing competing search 
engines on any of the devices they sell to consumers in exchange for 
payments.138 Consequently, manufacturers pre-install Google Search as the only 
search engine on all of their devices.139 
A. MARKET POWER IN THE INTERNET SEARCH MARKET 
The first step in the analysis of a potential exclusive dealing arrangement 
is defining the relevant market.140 The relevant product market is internet search, 
and the relevant geographic market is nationwide or worldwide because internet 
search is a high-technology product.141 Ever since the introduction of Google 
Search in 1997, Google has dominated the worldwide search engine market, and 
as of July 2019, Google had 88.61% market share.142 In July 2019, market leader 
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Google generated 62.5% of all internet search queries,143 and accounted for 
92.74% of the mobile internet search market in the United States.144 As 
evidenced by the statistics above, Google clearly possesses market power in the 
relevant market—the internet search market. 
B. FORECLOSURE OF COMMERCE 
Courts evaluate a variety of market conditions in assessing whether an 
exclusive agreement threatens harm to competition. Their inquiry generally 
focuses on competitors’ ability to reach the market in the face of the exclusive 
deal.145 Injury to competition “does not mean a simple loss of business or even 
the demise of a competitor but an impairment of the competitive structure of the 
market.”146 A majority of courts agree that the minimum percent of foreclosure 
required is 40%.147 The exclusive arrangement must not impose practical 
restrictions on a manufacturer’s freedom to purchase from a competitor; if 
competitors cannot circumvent the exclusive arrangement to reach the market, 
the court may conclude the arrangement harms competition.148 Binding 
agreements forcing manufacturers to configure Google Search as the default 
search engine position Google to sustain and grow its monopoly in the internet 
search market. As Google’s Senior Vice President of Product Management & 
Marketing said: 
[M]ore users more information, more information more users, more 
advertisers more users, more users more advertisers, it’s a beautiful thing, 
lather, rinse, repeat, that’s what I do for a living. So that’s[] [why] someone 
alluded to the engine that can’t be stopped.149  
This is a clear expression of Google’s plan to leverage its power in the 
internet search market—Google’s RSAs have succeeded in making it 
exceedingly difficult for any other mobile internet search app to gain traction.  
An example of the impact these exclusive deals have had on competitors 
in the internet search market are the deals between Google and Apple.150 In 
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exchange for pre-installing Google Search as the default internet search on 
Apple’s iPhone, Google made large payments to Apple in 2007.151 Then, in 
2014, Google was estimated to have paid $1 billion to Apple to be the only 
default search engine on iPhones and iPads.152 These deals were significant 
because approximately 33 million iPhones were purchased in the United States 
in 2014,153 and by March 2017, the number of iPhones sold worldwide grew to 
1.16 billion.154 By locking up the primary source of queries on mobile devices 
through an exclusive search default deal, Google eliminated future sources of 
competition and foreclosed rival search engines from fairness in the marketplace 
by preventing them the opportunity for distribution on Apple products.155  
In 2013, the FTC concluded an extensive investigation into allegations that 
Google entered into exclusive agreements for the distribution of Google Search, 
but decided not to take action against Google because Google agreed to take 
steps to change some of its suspect business practices.156 However, more 
recently, in July 2018, the Commission fined Google €4.34 billion for breach of 
EU antitrust law.157 One of the violations was due to Google’s illegal payments 
to manufacturers for exclusive pre-installation of Google Search across their 
entire portfolio of devices that ran on Android OS.158 The Commission found 
that these payments foreclosed competition by significantly reducing 
manufacturers’ incentives to contract with Google’s competitors and pre-install 
their apps.159 The Commission’s July 18, 2018 Press Release provides insight 
into the findings of the investigation. 
The Commission’s investigation showed that a rival search engine would 
have been unable to compensate a device manufacturer . . . for the loss of the 
revenue share payments from Google and still make profits. That is because, 
even if the rival search engine was pre-installed on only some devices, they 
would have to compensate the device manufacturer or mobile network 
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This makes clear that Google’s payments were conditioned on the 
manufacturer pre-installing only Google Search across all of the Android 
devices sold by that manufacturer, a central determination in finding Google’s 
conduct illegal. The Commission’s rationale should be taken into account in a 
substantial foreclosure analysis.  
Moreover, in 2013, around the time when the FTC concluded its 
investigation, Google had an almost 10% smaller share of the mobile internet 
search market in the United States than it does today.161 In July 2013, Google 
accounted for 79.7% of the market, compared to 88.6% in October 2018.162 
Additionally, following the EU’s record-breaking antitrust fine imposed on 
Google on July 18, 2018, FTC Chairman, Joseph Simons, released a statement 
saying he would “take a close look” at the Commission’s decision.163 The 
combination of (1) the FTC’s willingness to take another look at Google’s 
market position and changes in its business practices, (2) its growth since the 
close of the FTC’s last investigation in 2013, and (3) the EU’s €4.34 billion fine 
imposed in July 2018, altogether signal that Google’s exclusive dealing 
arrangements may well have foreclosed a substantial portion of the internet 
search market.  
C. HARM TO CONSUMERS 
Google’s exclusive deals harm consumers by limiting users’ access to 
competing mobile search engines. Although consumers could download and use 
substitute search engines, Google’s agreements with manufacturers reduce 
consumers’ ability to use and experiment with different search engines due to a 
variety of factors such as switching costs, difficulty in accessing them, and 
limited storage on their devices.164 The quality of consumers’ internet searches 
also suffers. If manufacturers were free to choose a default search engine other 
than Google Search, the quality of internet search for users would improve 
overall because search engines become smarter and more effective as they 
process greater numbers of search queries.165 A vast majority of users do not 
download competing apps and simply use the search engine that is pre-installed 
by the manufacturer.166 Therefore, search engines that are set as the default on a 
device are used significantly more frequently than non-default search engines, 
while competing search engines suffer from disuse because consumers would 
have to download them and they lack opportunities to become more effective.  
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Although firms and manufacturers may have procompetitive justifications 
for exclusive arrangements—such as ensuring product distributors do not pass 
off inferior products as their own, creating reliable and steady outlets for 
distributors, and encouraging distributors to promote the manufacturers’ 
products—the harm to consumers created by Google’s exclusive deals 
outweighs any potential justification. Moreover, in its defense in the recent EU 
antitrust case, Google claimed that its “payments based on exclusivity were 
necessary to convince device manufacturers and mobile network operators to 
produce devices for the Android ecosystem.”167 The Commission dismissed this 
claim.168 
If Google’s competitors were able to secure contracts with manufacturers 
in which their internet search products were set as the default, competitors’ 
search engines would become more effective as they process more queries. This 
threat would push Google to utilize resources and make an effort to improve 
Google Search. Instead, Google’s RSAs allow it to circumvent these potential 
costs by hamstringing manufacturers and blocking competitors from effectively 
engaging in the internet search market, to the detriment of consumers. Therefore, 
it is likely that Google has restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and has maintained its monopoly in violation of Section 2, by 
forcing manufacturers into these exclusive dealing arrangements.  
D. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE THROUGH EXCLUSIVE DEALS 
Exclusive dealing raises competitive concerns, so even if a dominant firm 
is not found to have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it may still violate 
Section 2.169 This is because the minimum amount of foreclosure required to 
suggest a Section 1 violation for exclusive dealing has dramatically increased 
over time.170 In 1949, when the Supreme Court addressed exclusive dealing in 
Standard Oil Co., it held that a 6.7% foreclosure of a market was unlawful.171 In 
contrast, in her 1984 Jefferson Parish concurrence, Justice O’Connor expressed 
no concern with a situation in which a firm with a 30% market share had 
exclusive dealing arrangements.172 Since Jefferson Parish, courts have said that 
the standard minimum percentage of foreclosure required is 40%, favoring 
defendants in exclusive dealing cases.173 Courts have credited multiple factors, 
such as procompetitive justifications, duration of exclusivity, and ease of 
termination of the agreement in making the foreclosure standard more difficult 
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for plaintiffs to overcome. Despite this challenge, Google’s exclusive deals 
allow it to maintain its monopoly in violation of Section 2, even if the deals do 
not illegally restrain trade under Section 1.  
The Microsoft case provides an example of where a firm was held liable 
under Section 2 for exclusive dealing, but not Section 1.174 At the trial court 
level, the plaintiff in Microsoft lost on its Section 1 exclusive dealing claim.175 
The court ruled that because rivals were not completely barred from reaching 
consumers, Microsoft did not illegally restrain trade through its exclusive 
agreements with manufacturers.176 On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit held 
that Microsoft violated Section 2 because its exclusive deals were illegal 
anticompetitive acts of monopoly maintenance.177  
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit addressed the differences between exclusive 
dealing under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.178 It stated that the basic 
concerns relevant to both sections are the same, but “a monopolist’s use of 
exclusive contracts, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a [Section] 2 
violation even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or 50% 
share usually required in order to establish a [Section] 1 violation.”179 
Microsoft’s exclusive dealing agreements prevented manufacturers from 
installing rival browsers to Internet Explorer, thereby protecting Microsoft’s 
monopoly.180 In its defense, Microsoft argued that the restrictions did not 
completely block its competitor, Netscape, from distributing its browser.181 The 
D.C. Circuit found this claim insufficient to shield it from Section 2 liability 
because “although Microsoft did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, 
it did bar them from the cost-efficient ones.”182  
Because Google’s exclusive dealing arrangements are similar to those in 
Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit’s rationale should provide a framework for analysis 
in a potential case against Google. Under Google’s RSAs, manufacturers agree 
to pre-install Google Search as the default search engine on all of their devices 
in exchange for large payments.183 Just as Microsoft had set Internet Explorer as 
the default browser, Google has set Google Search as the default search engine 
via its RSAs. Even if Google provides enough evidence to support a defense that 
its exclusive arrangements do not block rival search engine providers from all 
channels of distribution, following the precedent in Microsoft, Google may still 
violate Section 2.  
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Google makes enormous profits by having a significant data scale 
advantage over its competitors in the internet search market, and the more data 
it is able to collect from search queries, the more data it can use to sell targeted 
advertising. Through its exclusivity payments, Google ensures access to user 
data obtained through internet searches on Android devices. Therefore, even if 
Google proves that it does not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it at 
the very least bars them from the cost-efficient ones. This effectively limits 
competitors’ ability to reach the market in the face of Google’s exclusive dealing 
arrangements and allows it to maintain its monopoly in violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. 
IV.  OBSTRUCTION OF COMPETING ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Google promotes Android as an open-source operating system.184 Open-
source operating systems allow anyone to use and customize the software, 
whereas closed-source operating systems do not.185 An example of a closed-
source operating system is Apple’s iOS, the use of which allows Apple to control 
every aspect of its devices.186 A software platform is a two-sided market, 
meaning revenues can be realized on the manufacturer’s side (as buyers), or on 
the side of the app developers (as sellers).187 Google does not charge 
manufacturers to install Google’s version of Android or its apps,188 but it does 
charge app developers and in-app advertisers for bringing their offerings to 
market through Google Play.189 Google’s business model illustrates how the 
open-source nature of Android and its free provision of Google apps were crucial 
factors leading to Google’s dominance in the markets for Android operating 
systems and Android-compatible app stores.190 
Alternative modes of Android OS can be created by anyone because 
Android is open-source. An individual can make changes to Google’s version of 
Android OS by downloading the code to use as a base to expand on it. The 
Android Open Source Project website contains all of the information and source 
code needed to do so.191 When someone takes existing code and creates an 
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independent project based on it, a “fork” is created.192 Google protects its 
dominant position by closing and controlling its Android OS through its Android 
Compatibility Program and AFAs, which prevent manufacturers from using 
these alternative Android OS forks.193  
Google’s Android Compatibility Program contains a set of technical 
requirements that manufacturers are required to comply with before their devices 
can be branded as “Android” devices.194 Until recently, device manufacturers 
could choose from a variety of Android operating systems and a variety of open-
source alternatives to Google’s version of Android OS. Now, manufacturers 
must certify that their devices follow Google’s strict regulations before they are 
permitted to license core Android apps and use the “Android” trademark; 
without these, their devices are unlikely to establish commercial traction.195 One 
of the key provisions in Google’s MADA, which grants manufacturers the 
license to pre-install and distribute Google apps, explicitly prohibits 
manufacturers from endorsing forked versions of Android OS:  
Company shall not, and shall not allow any third party to . . . take any actions 
that may cause or result in the fragmentation of Android, including but not 
limited to the distribution by Company of a software development kit (SDK) 
derived from Android.196 
Access to Google’s apps and use of the mark “Android” is critical for 
manufacturers’ devices to be competitive in the marketplace. Manufacturers are 
thereby forcibly compelled to accept Google’s terms, including the prohibition 
against promoting the fragmentation of Android OS.  
Another contractual requirement that Google has imposed since the very 
first day Android launched in 2008 is the AFA.197 AFAs apply additional terms 
that explicitly limit the ability of device manufacturers to distribute independent 
devices that rely on forks of Android OS by forcing them to use only Google’s 
version of Android.198 By controlling Android OS in these ways, Google not 
only retains command of determining which apps are provided on Android 
devices, but also substantially limits the forks, or modes, in which Android 
runs.199  
Google’s prohibition against forking is anticompetitive conduct that likely 
violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. A Section 2 violation is established when 
two elements are met: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
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market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”200  
A. MONOPOLY POWER IN THE MOBILE DEVICE OPERATING SYSTEM MARKET 
As previously noted, the first step in proving a Section 2 claim is to provide 
evidence of monopoly power in the relevant market.201 For the purposes of this 
analysis, the product market is the mobile device operating system market, and 
the geographic market is nationwide or worldwide because operating systems 
are high-technology products.202 To determine whether a firm has monopoly 
power in a market, courts consider circumstantial evidence of the firm’s ability 
to control prices or exclude competition, and a significant indicator is market 
share.203 A market share in excess of 70% generally establishes a prima facie 
case of monopoly power in the United States, and a market share between 50–
75% has been sufficient in establishing a Section 2 claim in a complaint.204 
Android is used by 2 billion people around the world.205 Its market share in the 
mobile device operating system market worldwide is between 76.24% and 
85.9%.206 These statistics demonstrate that Android is clearly the most popular 
operating system in the world, and support a prima facie finding of monopoly 
power.  
B. MONOPOLY MAINTENANCE THROUGH EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 
As mentioned, the possession of monopoly power alone does not violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.207 A business with monopoly power must illegally 
enhance or maintain its monopoly through deliberate anticompetitive, or 
exclusionary, conduct.208 Courts agree that not all aggressive business conduct 
should be considered exclusionary, but have declined to define any bright line 
rules because of the difficulty in distinguishing between procompetitive conduct 
and anticompetitive conduct. This analysis is challenging because both types of 
conduct can have the apparent effect of forcing competitors out of the market.209 
However, a few factors have often appeared in courts’ analyses of whether 
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conduct is exclusionary, including: (1) the defendant’s intent, (2) the defendant’s 
justification for its conduct, and (3) the effect of the conduct and the sufficiency 
of the evidence that the defendant has caused, or is likely to cause, monopoly 
power to be acquired, enhanced, or maintained.210 
1. Intent 
The first factor, the defendant’s intent, is relevant to the exclusionary 
conduct analysis to the extent that it helps the court understand the likely effect 
of the monopolist’s conduct.211 General intent to defeat competitors and obtain 
monopoly status in a market is not sufficient, standing alone, to violate antitrust 
law, because the goal of every business is to win the competitive battle.212 
Rather, intent may be relevant if the purpose of the firm’s conduct was to exclude 
rivals on a basis other than efficiency.213  
Google’s course of conduct demonstrates Google’s realization that 
Android forks could be a threat to its dominance if product distributors were able 
to successfully sell devices that do not include Google’s apps in the United 
States. For example, in China, many of Google’s services are blocked, so 
Android forks are popular among consumers.214 This threat is Google’s 
underlying concern and motivation in requiring manufacturers to sign AFAs. 
Through these agreements, Google is attempting to inhibit new devices from 
excluding Google’s apps and Google’s version of Android OS. In addition, 
Google has recently limited access to updated versions of its apps to only those 
manufacturers that sign AFAs, making Android forks less attractive to 
consumers in the United States, where Google’s services are not blocked.215 As 
a result, manufacturers are forced to sign restrictive AFAs with Google or build 
smartphones without the latest Android technology and services. 
It is likely that Google’s purpose in creating the AFAs was to use its 
popularity with consumers in the United States as leverage to exclude 
competition. Google Play, which delivers over 95% of apps downloaded to 
Android smartphones,216 is clearly an all-important feature for device 
manufacturers to include with their products. Google is aware that Google Play 
and various other Google apps are ‘must haves’ for Android smartphones, and 
consequently has used this dominance to influence manufacturers. In order for 
their products to be branded as “Android” devices and to include these essential 
Google apps, manufacturers have no choice but to agree not to use or promote 
Android forks in the devices they sell to consumers. It is unlikely that Google’s 
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intent in generating this result was to increase the efficiency of its version of 
Android OS. If its intent was efficiency, it would not use its popular apps as 
leverage over device manufacturers. Rather, Google’s AFAs propagate its 
intent: to allow Google to maintain its monopoly by obstructing the development 
and distribution of competitors’ versions of Android OS. 
2. Justifications Do Not Outweigh Harm 
The second factor, the defendant’s justification for its conduct, is weighed 
based on multiple considerations such as the legitimacy and significance of the 
defendant’s proffered business justification, its relation to the conduct at issue, 
and the availability of less restrictive alternatives that can achieve the same 
result.217 In addition, the conduct cannot be more restrictive than reasonably 
necessary for competition on the merits.218  
According to Google’s Android Open Source Project website, “[a]s an 
open source project, Android’s goal is to avoid any central point of failure in 
which one industry player can restrict or control the innovations of any other 
player.”219 However, open-source systems are vulnerable to development into 
rival versions—“[w]hen anyone can amend the source code, it is hard to 
maintain the unity and coherence of the program” because changes in the code 
may make “it incompatible with all other versions of the program.”220 Google’s 
position is that the restrictions placed on manufacturers through the AFAs are 
necessary to prevent fragmentation of the Android ecosystem.221 Mobile 
platform fragmentation occurs when some users run older versions of an 
operating system, while other users actively run newer versions of the same 
operating system.222 In November 2017, over half of all Android devices, 
approximately 1 billion, were more than two years out-of-date.223 If Android’s 
fragmentation continues, Google maintains that the benefits of open-source 
programs to consumers, such as security, consistent user experience, and 
functionality, would dissipate because of the lack of a cohesive Android 
platform.224 
Although Google’s concerns are valid, its cited issues do not outweigh the 
harm that is created by requiring manufacturers to sign the AFAs. Google’s 
prohibition on the development of Android forks results in the inability of 
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manufacturers to develop and distribute alternative versions of Android and 
alternative apps, thereby inhibiting creativity and innovation. Intentionally 
preventing compatibility between apps and platforms in such a manner has been 
found to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held Microsoft liable under Section 2 for 
deceiving Java app developers into generating apps that were dependent on 
Windows OS and incompatible with other operating systems.225 Microsoft’s 
goal in doing so was to prevent cross-platform uses of Java, thereby protecting 
Windows’ monopoly in the operating system market.226 Microsoft engaged in 
illegal monopoly maintenance by restricting the development of apps and 
minimizing competitors’ influence in the market.227 By preventing the 
distribution and usefulness of Android forks, Google’s AFAs have a similar 
effect on the mobile device operating system market. 
Additionally, Microsoft was held liable for another Section 2 violation for 
entering into First Wave Agreements (FWAs) with manufacturers to use only 
Microsoft’s Java Virtual Machine (JVM) program.228 Under these FWAs, 
manufacturers agreed to make their Java apps reliant on Windows-specific 
technology and to refrain from distributing JVM programs that were compatible 
with the technology of Microsoft’s competitors.229 This anticompetitive conduct 
that Microsoft engaged in parallels Google’s current conduct. Google justifies 
its restraint on creativity by maintaining that the AFAs and Google’s new app 
restrictions protect Android OS from fragmentation.230 This reasoning parallels 
one of Microsoft’s defenses of its FWA contracts. Microsoft claimed that the 
FWAs were a practical solution to ensuring uniformity and efficiency in order 
to benefit consumers.231 Google claims that its actions benefit consumers by 
ensuring that apps run seamlessly across all devices using the Android OS.232 
However, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft rejected this claim and held that the 
FWAs significantly precluded the development and distribution of alternative 
versions of the JVM program, thus illegally protecting Microsoft’s monopoly 
from threats of competition.233 Along similar lines, Google’s stifling of 
competition and diminishing of incentives to innovate result in far greater harm 
to consumers than any legitimate, procompetitive benefits that may arise. 
There are less-restrictive alternatives to AFAs that Google can adopt to 
combat fragmentation of Android OS. Preventing the emergence of Android 
forks is not necessary for Google to ensure that devices using its version of 
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Android are compliant with its technical requirements.234 Google can implement 
updated procedures for its apps and version of Android OS to ensure reliability 
without tightening its grip on Android and using compatibility as leverage to get 
manufacturers to do what they want. It is also important to note that Google has 
not had much pressure to arrive at a solution to fragmentation because “Android 
isn’t, by any means, losing steam, and users haven’t exactly grabbed pitchforks 
and showed up to Mountain View demanding change.”235  
3. Enhancement and Maintenance of Monopoly Power 
The third factor that has appeared frequently in courts’ analyses of whether 
conduct is exclusionary is the sufficiency of evidence showing that the conduct 
has, or is likely to, cause monopoly power to be acquired, enhanced, or 
maintained.236 In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held that causation may be inferred 
when “exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent competitive 
technologies as well as when it is aimed at producers of established 
substitutes.”237 The court realized that it would be unreasonable to require 
Section 2 liability to turn on a plaintiff’s inability to reconstruct the hypothetical 
marketplace that would have existed without the defendant’s anticompetitive 
conduct.238  
Given this issue, the D.C. Circuit’s test for causation was not whether the 
competing products would actually have developed into viable substitutes for 
Microsoft’s dominant product.239 Instead, the court’s analysis focused on (1) 
whether “the exclusion of nascent threats [was] the type of conduct that [was] 
reasonably capable of contributing significantly” to Microsoft’s continued 
monopoly power, and (2) whether the competing products “reasonably 
constituted nascent threats at the time Microsoft engaged in the anticompetitive 
conduct at issue.”240 Under this framework, the D.C. Circuit held that (1) the 
entire purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent monopolists from having free 
reign to destroy nascent competitors at will, particularly in a fast-paced 
technology industry, and (2) the District Court made sufficient findings showing 
that Microsoft’s competitors had potential to threaten Microsoft’s dominant 
product in the marketplace.241  
In applying the Microsoft framework in a case against Google, it is 
necessary to show that at the time Google obstructed the development and 
distribution of alternative versions of Android OS, competitors had the potential 
to threaten Google’s dominance. If Google did not prohibit Android forks, 
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Amazon’s Fire OS, a version of Android, could have been a rival. Shortly after 
its launch in 2014, Amazon was forced to take a $170 million write-down charge 
on costs related to Fire OS while still having $83 million worth of devices in its 
inventory.242 Fire OS devices did not offer Google Play, use the “Android” 
trademark, or come pre-installed with any of Google’s proprietary apps.243 They 
used Amazon’s app store, which has about 240,000 apps, a paltry amount 
compared to the over 1 million apps on the Google Play store in 2014.244 
Because Fire OS devices did not come pre-installed with popular services 
provided by Google’s proprietary apps, consumers were deterred by the fact that 
access to Google’s services was cumbersome.245 It is also important to note that 
as part of its validation in fining Google €4.34 billion for antitrust violations in 
July 2018, the Commission said that it “found evidence that Google’s conduct 
prevented a number of large manufacturers from developing and selling devices 
based on Amazon’s Android fork called ‘Fire OS.’”246 Fire OS could have been 
a potential threat to Google’s dominance in the mobile device operating system 
market in the United States as an alternative Android OS platform and could 
have provided a platform for rival search engines and apps to gain more 
traffic.247 The failure of potential rivals like Fire OS in the mobile device 
operating system market is evidence that Google’s prohibitions on forking have 
helped it maintain its monopoly power.  
Google’s conduct has allowed it to maintain its monopoly power, and this 
conduct is likely to continue to enhance its power. Consumers will continue to 
suffer from fewer and fewer choices and stagnant product development. 
Additionally, if Google succeeds in totally eliminating the competition in the 
mobile device operating system market, it will have the complete freedom to 
charge higher prices for its version of Android OS.  
In the past, Google has abruptly imposed a price on a marketing platform 
product it had once offered for free—Google Analytics (“Analytics”). When 
Google introduced Analytics in 2005, there was healthy competition and 
innovation in the market for web analytics.248 All of Analytics’ features were 
given to users for free, and what had once been a flourishing market quickly 
became the opposite.249 Once its rivals had been forced out of the market, 
Google suddenly hiked its price and began charging “premium” users who 
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wanted advanced features a $150,000 annual fee for a product that gained 
dominance because it had been offered for free.250  
If Google is allowed to continue its prohibition on Android forks, 
competition in the mobile device operating system market will continue to 
dissolve and it will gain an even greater monopoly. With no competitive forces 
to pressure Google, Google will have the freedom to charge users for Android, 
just as it did with Analytics. For the aforementioned reasons, and in conformity 
with the Microsoft decision, Google has likely violated Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act by obstructing the development and distribution of Android forks. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote competition, consumer 
welfare, and innovation. Consumers are deprived of meaningful options as 
Google starves potential competitors of the opportunities and resources to create 
and provide viable options for society. Google should be required to end the 
tying of Google Search and Google Chrome to Google Play and its version of 
Android OS, withdraw its contracts with manufacturers that make payments 
conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search, and cease restrictive 
practices that prevent manufacturers from selling devices that run on alternative 
versions of Android OS. These steps are necessary to restore competition vital 
to the digital economy.  
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